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Australian Law to Combat to Illegal logging in Indonesia: A Gossamer Chain for
Transnational Enforcement of Environmental Law
Gregory Rose
Two countries; combined crime-fighting ability might be greater than the sum of their
individual capacities where their capabilities complement each other. This article investigates transnational coordination against environmental crime. Australian utilization
of mutual legal assistance and anti-money laundering mechanisms to prosecute offences
related to illegal logging in Indonesia are examined as a case study. In theory, interrupting the transfer of proceeds of environmental crime across national borders enhances transnational law enforcement. The case study demonstrates that difficult legal
obstacles can obstruct practical cooperation between neighbouring countries combating transnational environmental crime in the timber sector. Therefore, international
harmonization of environmental crime laws is needed.
INTRODUCTION
The connections between transnational crime and environmental crime are present in
illegal logging. This article surveys Australian and Indonesian laws against illegal logging and against dealing in the proceeds of crime, with a view to analysing whether
those countries’ laws can work together. It commences by placing IndonesianAustralian illegal timber trade within the context of transnational environmental crime
and compares the criminalization of illegal logging and of dealing in the proceeds of
crime within each jurisdiction. It then undertakes a case study that follows the proceeds
from Indonesian illegal logging in Australian law with a view to their confiscation. It
focuses on ‘dual criminality’ and finds that Australian laws can be used to seize proceeds from illegal logging in Indonesia. However, prosecutions for illegal logging and
related crimes, such as money laundering, require a commitment of law enforcement
resources and concomitant international cooperation. The practical hurdles in securing
evidence may be insuperable. Nevertheless, the return on cooperative labours will be
greater than the sum of each country’s lone actions.
TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME
An environmental crime can be defined as an action in breach of a national environmental law where that breach is subject to prosecution and, on conviction, the imposition of
criminal penalties.1 The term ‘transnational environmental crime’ simply refers to environmental crime that has elements that cross national borders.2
The nature of the cross-border elements can vary widely, from physical acts such as
simple poaching and smuggling by a lone operator, to intangible acts such as conspiring
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in complex layered transactions across multiple jurisdictions by organized criminal syndicates.3 The latter might include bribery and corruption to support the domestic commission of the offence,4 whilst money laundering disguises the illicit origin of proceeds
and facilitates their transboundary movement back to criminals.5
For example, ‘ramin’, a valuable once plentiful species of light hardwood that has been
depleted in Indonesia, is subject to a national ban on logging and commercial trade. It is
logged illegally in protected areas, such as the Tanjung Puting National Park in Indonesian Borneo. Neighbouring Malaysia is a transit destination for illegally sourced Indonesian ramin to be issued with fraudulent certificates of origin.6 After transport to processing centres such as China, India and Vietnam and conversion into timber products,7
it is exported via other countries such as Hong Kong, Singapore or Taiwan for marketing to consumers in Europe, North America, China or Japan.8 It has been alleged that
some of the world’s largest flooring companies acquire cheap timber at auction on the
‘spot market’ indifferent to its illegal origin.9 These timber harvesting and transportation structures, and the movement of proceeds back to Indonesia, evidence the complicated transnational networks familiar to organized timber crimes.10
Illegal logging stands out as one of the world’s most profitable forms of environmental
crime. It is estimated that approximately 10% of global timber is produced illegally. In
2015, the global timber market was estimated at US$250 billion of which US$25 billion
was attributable to illegal sourcing.11 Illicit timber production at such volumes drives
down the commodity price and harms the licit industry by over-saturating the timber
market.12 It can also cause declines in public revenue, biodiversity, soil, water quality,
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climate management and the rule of law.13 The timber illegally produced in Indonesia in
2013 was estimated to cost the government US$2 billion in revenue.14
Illegal logging is most commonly associated with developing equatorial States, but it
occurs in all types of forests throughout South-East Asia, Central Africa, Eastern Europe, Russia, South America and North America.15 About 50% of the world’s illegal
timber (i.e., 40 million m³) in 2013 came from Indonesia.16 Half of all illegally produced timber is destined for China, which has become the world’s major processing hub
for wood products.17
INDONESIAN-AUSTRALIAN ILLEGAL TIMBER NEXUS
By 2004, over one-third of Indonesian forest had been devastated by illegal logging, 43
million from an original 120 million hectares.18 Estimates of the percentage of illegal
logging are high, 40% of total timber production as at 2013, down from a peak at over
80% illegal production in 2000.19 The decline reflects a shift away from major logging
concessions in natural forests, to plantations for the production of timber (for pulp and
paper) and for oil palm. Despite the decline in the percentage of illegal logging, the rate
of deforestation overall is increasing due to illegal forest conversion for oil palm and
timber plantation, as well as the entry of small-scale producers.20
Indonesia is Australia’s third most valuable supplier of regulated timber products and,
during the period 2009-2013, Indonesian timber product exports to Australia annually
averaged US$394.5 million.21 Tracing the legal origin of timber products is difficult,
with only an estimated 8% being raw timber and the rest constituting furniture, paper,
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plywood and other processed building products.22 It has been estimated that 9% of the
total amount of timber and timber products imported to Australia is sourced illegally.23
The Australian Government has sought for several years to reduce the importation of
illegal timber and related products, and to ensure that all forest products imported into
Australia are sustainably sourced.24 Some timber importers adopted voluntary standards
internal to the industry and 22% of importers relied on forest certification schemes to
verify the legality of timber, such as the Australian Forestry Standard. 25 Until recently,
there was no national industry-wide standard to avoid the importation, use and sale of
illegally sourced timber products.26 The Australian Parliament adopted a timber legality
framework, the Illegal Logging Prohibition Act, to promote trade in legally logged timber in 2012. It imposes obligations on importers and processers to exercise due diligence to manage the risk of handling illegally logged timber.27
CRIMINALIZATION OF ILLEGAL LOGGING
Illegal logging is a term commonly used but not formally defined. It is set out here as
the sourcing, transport or conversion of timber in contravention of national laws including sourcing of timber from: areas without permission or in breach of logging permit
conditions; internationally or domestically recognized protected zones; protected species; or in excess of authorized limits, as well as the conduct of such activities with
permits obtained through corruption or without paying the legally required fees and taxes.28
INDONESIA
There has been a decentralization of power in recent years in many areas of Indonesian
governance of natural resources from national to local legislatures.29 The national legislature retains superior authority and the following discussion considers the legislative
regime at a national level.
Indonesian logging was initially regulated in 1967 under national forestry laws in a
piecemeal fashion. Following President Soeharto’s ‘New Order’ regime, the Habibie
22
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Government passed a Law on Forestry30 to govern the industry comprehensively.31 The
term ‘illegal logging’ (‘pembalakan liar’) is not defined in the Law on Forestry and its
meaning must be understood from the specifically proscribed conduct, such as causing
forest harm.32 The proscribed conduct constitutes serious offences under the Indonesian
Penal Code (which divides unlawful conduct between serious and lesser offences), attracting penalties of 5-10 years imprisonment and hefty fines.33 Investigations are conducted by forestry officials34 and powers to arrest and detain are held by the police35
who ultimately decide whether a criminal prosecution should be initiated. 36 National
Police investigation progress and the governance integrity in the Ministry of Forests
remain weak. For example, in Riau, Sumatra, investigations into 13 of 14 companies
suspected of illegal logging were unexpectedly discontinued in late 2008.37
Unfortunately, corruption is endemic at the local level in both the forestry and police
services.38 In 2005, as part of a policy against corruption, then President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono instructed prosecutors to prosecute illegal logging in connection with
corruption. 39 A specialized team was established to boost the national effort and the
Government enjoyed some success, disclosing that certain criminals engaged in illegal
logging had connections with major companies. Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication
30

Law No. 41/1999 on Forestry (‘Law on Forestry’).
In 2004, the Megawati Government added provisions that grandfathered mining inside forest areas under agreements made prior to the Law on Forestry, ibid., until the termination of such agreements (Law
No. 19/ 2004 on the Approval of Presidential Decree No. 1/ 2004 on the Amendment of the Law on Forestry).
32
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water-sources (wells), rivers, river-tributaries, cliffs or shores (Section 50.3(c)); cuts timber or harvests or
collects forest products inside forests without possessing a right or a license from an authoritative official
(Section 50.3(e)); takes, buys, sells, takes for exchange, entrusts, stores, or possesses forest products,
known or reasonably suspected to have originated from forest areas and to have been collected illegally
(Section 50.3 (f)); transports, controls or possesses forest products without a Legal Forest Product Transportation Permit concerning the legality of the forest products (Section 50.3(h)); or brings heavy tools
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area, without approval from an official in authority (Section 50.3(j)).
33
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of 5 years and 10 billion rupiah (US$$1 million), while bringing equipment for transportation of forest
products without authorisation carries up to 5 years and 5 billion rupiah (Law on Forestry, ibid., Section
78).
34
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35
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36
The police lay a criminal charge at the initial step of conducting an investigation, without obligation to
consult with another agency; see Law No. 8/1981 on Indonesian Criminal Procedures.
37
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Commission has made progress, with at least two successful major corruption prosecutions,40 but the difficulties of securing evidence of corrupt behaviour remain frustrating.
Timber crime reports have fallen, perhaps due to greater criminal sophistication.41 The
most common convictions are of truck drivers carrying illegal logs. No evidentiary link
tends to be found between the drivers and any information held in financial institutions
concerning money laundering by the timber barons.42
AUSTRALIA
Australian laws against illegal logging do not parallel those of Indonesia. Australia is a
federation where the primary responsibility for forest management and law enforcement
lies with sub-national state and territory governments.43 They are signatories to the Australian National Forest Policy Statement, which promotes nationally coordinated forest
policy, and has goals of developing an ‘economically viable and ecologically sustainable forest industry’,44 including the prevention of illegal logging. The states have concluded Regional Forest Agreements with the Federal Government that provide frameworks for their respective forest conservation efforts. Although the term ‘illegal logging’ is not used or defined in these instruments, proscriptions of breaches of the relevant legislation define pertinent crimes in each sub-national jurisdiction.
A cursory survey of the legislation indicates that offences related to illegal logging are
minor, attracting relatively modest penalties, rather than indictable (i.e., entailing a jail
sentence of up to a year or more). For example, in New South Wales, the cutting or removal of any timber from a state forest is an offence attracting a fine or six months imprisonment.45 In instances where the illegal logging occurs in a national park in New
South Wales, it is prohibited to possess or sell a protected native plant attracting a fine
or six months imprisonment.46
Constitutional jurisdiction over imports and exports gave the federal government the
power to legislate over the Australian trade in illegally harvested timber. 47 It defines
illegally logged as timber that has been ‘harvested in contravention of laws in force in
the place (whether or not in Australia) where the timber was harvested’.48 Accordingly,
the Illegal Logging Prohibition Act 2012 makes it an offence to intentionally, knowingly or recklessly import or process illegally logged timber or timber products. This of-
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42
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Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, ‘National Forest Policy Statement’ (1992), at 1.
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309.
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Australian Constitution, Section 51(i).
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fence is indictable, and entails up to five years imprisonment.49 However, it does not
criminalize the illegal logging itself but, rather, dealing in the proceeds of the crime.
ILLEGAL TIMBER HANDLING AND LAUNDERING CRIMES
Money laundering is essentially the hiding of goods or profits obtained by criminal
means from the attention of law enforcement agencies and other criminals.50 It also involves dealing in property which is the proceeds of crime.51 A three-part definition of
money laundering derived from the Convention on Transnational Organised Crime is:
(i) any act which is performed directly, or through a third party intermediary; (ii) which
deals with funds, property or recognizable legal rights of any kind; (iii) when such act is
designed to prevent the discovery of the origin of the property.52 An intergovernmental
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was established by the Group of 7 in 1989 at the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). It issued recommendations in 1990 to combat money laundering. The 40 recommendations are implemented to varying degrees in 182 economic jurisdictions.53
In the context of money laundering, the original crime is called a predicate offence. Although the operation of money laundering offences was traditionally confined to the
proceeds of well-recognized crimes such as drug trafficking, the range of predicate offences is broadening in accordance with FATF recommendations to include environmental crimes.54 It would be difficult to continue to profit from the massive illegal exploitation of forestry resources without concealing the criminal origin of timber proceeds by utilising money laundering techniques. Illegal logging is, thus, inextricably
linked to money laundering and anti-money laundering (AML) regimes offer a way to
combat it.55
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Ibid., Sections 8-9 and 15.
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128.
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Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna, 20 December 1988; in force 1 November 1990), Article 3.1(b)-(c). called for their implementation. The Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (New York, 15 November 2000; in force 29 September 2003), Articles 6-7, requires that
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54
Ibid., Recommendation 1 states that countries should criminalize money laundering in relation to all
serious offences, or a threshold of offence categories or penalties, or listed offences. Environmental crime
is listed as a category of offence in the glossary.
55
See B. Setiono and Y. Husein, n. 42 above, at 9 and 30.
50

INDONESIA
In 2002, the Indonesian Government introduced laws to criminalize money laundering. 56 The offences that could trigger prosecution for money laundering were specified.57 The new laws were considered by the FATF as being an inadequate implementation of the relevant items in its ‘40 recommendations’ to combat money laundering and
it threatened to blacklist financial transactions with Indonesian financial institutions unless further and more comprehensive implementation was achieved.58 Consequently, an
expanded range of offences was introduced through amendments in 2003.59 The predicate offences now include forestry, environmental and maritime offences and any offence subject to four years imprisonment.60
An expanded range of AML duties was identified, which obliged financial institutions
to be more prudent in ensuring compliance with the new system and to conduct a higher
level of due diligence on their transactions. 61 Large cash transactions and suspicious
transactions are to be reported to the Indonesia Transactions Report and Analysis Centre
(PPATK).62 Penalties for money laundering were also increased. They are 5-15 years
imprisonment and a fine of 100 million-5 billion rupiah (US$10,000 to $1.5 million).63
Instead of imprisonment, corporate contraventions may result in penalties such as dissolution, liquidation and the revocation of business licences.64 In addition to these sanctions, the instruments used to commit the crimes and the criminal proceeds are both subject to forfeiture65 and there is provision for confiscation of the proceeds of crime upon
conviction for a predicate offence. A civil procedure to seize property embezzled from
the State is available to government agencies66 and introduction of a non-conviction dependent law on civil forfeiture is currently under consideration by the Indonesian legislature.67
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Law No. 15/2002 on the Crime of Money Laundering; and Law No. 25/2003 Amending Law No.
15/2002 (‘Law on the Crime of Money Laundering’). Section 1 defines money laundering as ‘an act of
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legitimate’.
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67
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Nations Asia and Far East Institute, 2015). A. Wibawa et al., ‘The Recovery of the Assets of the Criminal
Acts of Corruption as the Country's Financial Rescue Efforts’, 3:2 Journal of Humanity (2015), 108.

The PPATK is the key Indonesian authority responsible for AML activity.68 In particular, it has the authority to identify, investigate, and request the confiscation of the proceeds of crime. However, as is usual for financial intelligence units, the PPATK does
not have prosecutorial powers. The Indonesian National Police have sole authority to
prepare a dossier and, if the financial crimes investigation unit is satisfied that conduct
should be prosecuted, the police refer the matter to the Public Prosecutor’s Office or the
Attorney-General who may authorise prosecution.69 The inability of PPATK to bring
prosecutions in its own right can frustrate its AML activities as the Indonesian National
Police do not have similar skills to PPATK analysts and remain subject to corruption.
An Indonesian Timber Legality Assurance System (TLAS)70 was introduced in 2012. It
serves to suppress laundering of illegally harvested logs by requiring that exporters of
Indonesian timber products obtain a Timber Legality Certificate (‘SVLK’) for harvested
timber and a V-Legal verification document for each shipment. In 2013, Indonesia became the first Asian country to sign a Voluntary Partnership Agreement under the European Union (EU) Timber Regulation concerning the legality of harvested timber exported to the European Union common market.71 It then was the first country in the
world, on 15 November 2016, to be authorized to issue licences under this EU Regulation. The EU Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT) licences are
issued subject to a Timber Legality Certificate under the TLAS. Importers into the EU
of timber products covered by a FLEGT licence are exempted from undertaking their
own independent due diligence checks on the legality of the source of timber. The licensing system is in its early days and is overseen by an EU-Indonesia Joint Implementation Committee.
AUSTRALIA
Criminal proceeds in Australia were estimated in 2004 to be worth AU$4.5 billion a
year. 72 The Australian Criminal Code proscribes money laundering 73 and the AntiMoney Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act (AML-CTF Act),74 Financial
Transactions Reports Act75 (AUSTRAC Act) and the Proceeds of Crime Act76 also play
key roles in an administrative regime to identify transactions involving the proceeds of
crime (or financing of terrorism) and to institute a mechanism for the confiscation of
any such proceeds.
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It was established under the Law on the Crime of Money Laundering, n. 56 above Sections 18-29B.
See B. Setiono and Y. Husein, n. 42 above, at 16-17.
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72
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75
Financial Transactions Reports Act 1988 (Cth).
76
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth).
69

The Illegal Logging Prohibition Act 2012 makes it an indictable offence to import illegally logged timber,77 to import it in regulated timber products,78 or to process illegally
logged raw logs.79 Thus, it criminalizes certain forms of handling (importation or processing) of the proceeds of a specified crime (illegal logging).80 The criminal intent is
premised on a culprit’s failure to meet the statutory duty of due diligence. The Act’s
regulations specify due diligence requirements as: (i) information gathering; 81 (ii)
checking the reliability of the information by using a timber legality framework or
country-specific guideline; (iii) risk assessment by considering whether other information might indicate illegality; and, if so, then (iv) risk mitigation.82 The use of a recognized timber legality assurance framework refers to a standard in international use
such as that of the EU,83 whereas compliance with a country-specific guideline refers to
a recognized national system such as the Indonesian TLAS. 84 If no timber legality
framework or national guideline is in place, it becomes necessary to conduct an independent risk assessment (step iii above), taking into account the prevalence of illegal
logging in the harvesting area, illegal harvesting of the specific species, and the presence of armed conflict as risk factors, as well as the complexity of the product and any
other available information. 85 The risk mitigation process (which requires making a
written record of the process of consideration) must be proportionate to the identified
risk and may include a decision not to import a timber product.86 A fine applies for a
failure to undertake any step of the due diligence requirements.
The Criminal Code (Division 400) criminalizes general dealings with, including importing, the proceeds of crime.87 Property is defined in broad enough terms to include timber.88 Conduct is criminalized when a person deals in money or property that is the proceeds of crime.89 The dealings are criminalized whether a person acted with deliberate
intent, recklessness or negligence in relation to the fact that the property is proceeds of
crime, although the applicable penalties diminish as the person’s conscious deliberation
attenuates.90 In addition, the possession of property reasonably suspected of being proceeds of crime is criminalized.91 It is not necessary to prove that the particular predicate
77
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offence was committed or that a particular person committed the offence, but merely the
fact that the property dealt with was proceeds of crime.92 That threshold fact would need
to be proved to the common law criminal standard, i.e. beyond a reasonable doubt. The
geographical scope of application of Division 400 includes dealings which occur, in
whole or in part, in Australia or which are conducted by Australian residents or citizens.93
The federal Proceeds of Crime Act provides for the confiscation of the proceeds of
crime. The two forms of confiscation proceedings most relevant to dealing with illegally
logged timber would be first, proceeding against assets following a conviction, and second, against suspect assets without conviction.94 The first is a criminal procedure that
produces forfeiture upon conviction of the predicate offence. This confiscation procedure is not a criminal penalty and is therefore different to prosecution for the predicate
offence itself under the Criminal Code. The second is a civil procedure, applicable when
there has been no conviction for the predicate crime but when dealing in the proceeds of
crime is reasonably suspected.95
Part V of the AUSTRAC Act established the Australian Transaction Reports Analysis
Centre (AUSTRAC) which is the Australian financial intelligence unit. It is the authority responsible for the performance of functions prescribed by the AML-CTF Act. 96
AUSTRAC oversees financial reporting requirements by collecting and analysing financial transactions.97 A wide range of Australian institutions are covered by the AMLCTF Act (including casinos, bullion and gem dealers, law practices, etc.),98 which requires them to properly identify their customers99 and to report suspicious transactions
to AUSTRAC.100 AUSTRAC provides its accumulated financial intelligence and information to other authorities such as the Australian Taxation Office, the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Crime Commission.101 It, like the PPATK, does not conduct
prosecutions itself.
FOLLOWING PROCEEDS FROM ILLEGAL INDONESIAN LOGGING IN
AUSTRALIA: A TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME CASE
STUDY
An AML regime ‘follows the money’ or other proceeds of crime back to the illegal
source. In relation to the proceeds of illegal logging, it starts by identifying a business
profile with ‘suspicious wealth’ and then links the wealth back to the forestry sector and
92
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to the illegal logging. It has been suggested that Indonesian financial service providers
should suspect logging transactions to be high risk.102 The PPATK has sought to distinguish normal patterns of forestry transactions from those that are unusual and suspicious.103
While the centralized Indonesian AML regime might avoid the obstacles posed by
large-scale regional and local corruption within the fragmented forestry regulation system, hopes for successful investigations are based on the premise that there continues to
be no obstructing corruption in the centralized financial regulatory system.104 The integrity of the current AML regime is supported by intense anti-corruption efforts.105 Yet,
bribery remains pervasive among forestry officers, police and customs officials, politicians, court officials and judges.106 The difficulties were exemplified in the acquittal of
a rich and powerful ex-police commissioner on charges of money laundering and corruption 107 and the release of a high-profile timber baron wanted for money laundering. 108 Therefore, the PPATK financial intelligence relating to transnational timber
crime might be more strategically used in conjunction with foreign AML regimes for
prosecutions outside Indonesia.109
Australia imports AU$4.4 billion Australian of timber and wood products (excluding
furniture) annually, of which it is estimated that up to AU$400 million come from illegally harvested sources.110 Although the Commonwealth AML regime has been applied
to trafficking in drugs and other contraband, it has not yet been applied to illegal logging.
The Australian capacity to identify, investigate, gather intelligence, prosecute and confiscate the proceeds of crime in relation to transnational organized criminal activities is
relatively strong.111 The agencies under the Attorney-General, including the Australian
Criminal Intelligence Commission, the Australian Federal Police and AUSTRAC, as
well as the Department of Agriculture, might combat illegal logging in Indonesia
through the focused enforcement of Australian illegal timber and AML laws. AUS102
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TRAC, in cooperation with PPATK, could track dealings that originate with Indonesian
illegal logging and end in Australian importation of the illegally harvested timber. It
could also track the proceeds of sales which are made in Australia and that return as
cash to Indonesia. AUSTRAC might also consider issuing guidelines for dealers in timber transactions, specifying high standards of due diligence in relation to the detection
of illegal logging.
ILLEGAL TIMBER SCENARIO
The following section brings together the threads of discussion concerning Australian
and Indonesian laws by presenting a case to test the potential use of prosecution and
confiscation actions in Australia to combat dealings in products from illegal harvesting
in Indonesia. In our hypothetical scenario, an Australian owned and operated company,
called Hardware Wholesaler, imports timber flooring and fittings from Indonesia. The
Australian company’s primary source is P.T. Graha Buana, a housing materials company in Indonesia owned and operated by a family in Medan, Sumatra. The company harvests its own raw timber for processing and is known for its illegal logging practices in
its operations in both Sumatra and West Papua. It holds licences to export timber products to Australia generated from both the Sumatran and Papuan logging operations.
The Australian division of an environmental advocacy group, called Forest Defence,
lobbies publicly against the marketing of P.T. Graha Buana wood products in Australia,
collaborating with an Indonesian environment group to gather information concerning
the illegal logging and its downstream products. They obtain DNA evidence that the
shipment of flooring currently being sold by Hardware Wholesaler is from the species
merbau, harvested in West Papua and for which P.T. Graha Buana does not hold a valid logging licence. The information is presented to the Australian Attorney-General together with a call for the prosecution of Hardware Wholesaler for dealing in the proceeds of crime, which are the merbau timber flooring and fittings imported from P.T.
Graha Buana, including money from their sale, and the confiscation of those proceeds.
AUSTRALIAN ILLEGAL LOGGING PROHIBITION ACT
Under the Illegal Logging Prohibition Act 2012, an offence may be committed by importing the timber from P.T. Graha Buana, without the need to prove that the actual
timber in the shipment was illegally logged. It is sufficient to prove that it was imported
in breach of the due diligence standard owed under Australian law by Hardware Wholesaler. To prove due diligence compliance, the defendant would need to demonstrate either that it made an independent risk assessment and took proportionate mitigation action, or that its shipments conform to requirements of the Indonesian TLAS as demonstrated by a V-Legal document, or that it conforms to an approved international legality
framework, as demonstrated by a Timber Legality Certificate.112
In relation to a timber legality framework, Hardware Wholesaler would need a certificate issued to the harvester that provides evidence of its compliance with the legality
framework. In relation to a country guideline, Hardware Wholesaler would need an In112
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donesian Timber Legality Certificate.113 If it has neither that nor an EU or other equivalent international certificate, then, in light of lobbying by Forest Defence, the risk assessment would have to take into account allegations and information against P.T. Graha Buana, including factors such as the species of timber, place of harvesting, legal
rights to harvest and payment for harvesting rights, in order to determine whether it was
illegally harvested. Hardware Wholesaler would then have to take proportionate mitigation action. If there is a likelihood of offending against the importation prohibition, the
logical action would be not to import.
Breaches of the Illegal Logging Prohibition Act 2012 can lead to both criminal and civil
penalties. Criminal penalties of up to five years gaol apply for the intentional, knowing
or reckless importation or processing of illegally logged timber or timber products.114
Civil penalties in the form of fines (of up to AU$18,000) apply for breaches of any step
of the due diligence requirements.115
MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
An Australian investigation concerning alleged money laundering and dealing in the
proceeds by Hardware Wholesaler in Australia from illegally harvested timber imported from Indonesia could also be pursued as a separate legal action. The acquisition by
Australian investigators of information as to the location of logging sites, conditions of
licences, confirmation of DNA data, evaluations of value, shipping operations of P.T.
Graha Buana, etc., need the assistance of Indonesian police. To secure international assistance in criminal investigations and prosecutions, national law enforcement authorities must build mutual cooperation relationships with agencies in other countries.
Australia and Indonesia have established a working relationship in law enforcement cooperation only relatively recently. The 1995 Treaty between Australia and the Republic
of Indonesia on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters entered into force in 1999.116
There has not yet been any mutual assistance in matters of environmental crime. Concerning money laundering, the mutual assistance treaty undertakings cover confiscation
and forfeiture. Each country may request urgent ‘freezing’ action by the other to prevent
any dealing in, transfer or disposal of suspected proceeds of crime, pending a final determination in respect of those proceeds by a court of the requesting country. 117 A premise of
mutual legal assistance is that the crimes of concern for cooperation be equivalent in
each jurisdiction, having the quality of ‘dual criminality’. As the laws criminalizing
money laundering and the procedures for the confiscation of the proceeds of crime are
similar in each jurisdiction, mutual assistance in relation to them should not be problematic. For example, Indonesia has previously requested and been granted assistance in
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relation to retrieving the proceeds of a major corruption case.118 Although legal cooperation has not yet been undertaken in the area of money laundering related to environmental crimes, such as illegal logging, the framework is there to be utilized.
DUAL CRIMINALITY IN PREDICATE OFFENCES
Under Australian law, not all crimes qualify as predicate offences for AML prosecutions. The Commonwealth Criminal Code identifies only indictable offences, or more
serious offences, as predicate offences.119 As mentioned above, in cases where that original predicate offence was not committed in Australia, an AML prosecution can still
take place. It is not necessary under the Australian law to prove the actual commission
by convicted persons of the particular instances of predicate offences. Instead, the predicate offences would need merely to be demonstrated as having occurred. However, the
foreign predicate offence needs to be equivalent to an Australian predicate offence.120
The definition of a foreign indictable offence requires that there be dual criminality, i.e.
that there be an equivalent to the foreign crime in Australia. The essential question then
is whether illegal logging in Indonesia is conduct that would, had it occurred in Australia, be an indictable offence under Australian law? Unfortunately, forestry offences in
Australia are not indictable. However, other real avenues exist to circumvent this shortfall in dual criminality.
First, as an alternative to the use of correlated forestry offences, the taking of logs might
be characterized as a theft of government property. The ‘theft of land or things forming
part of land’ belonging to the Commonwealth121 is an indictable offence under Australian law.122 This has its correlate in Indonesian law, where illegal logging on Indonesian
Government lands is treated as theft from the Indonesian Government. 123 Major theft of
government resources is treated in Indonesian law as corruption.124 Second, the link between corruption and illegal logging in Indonesia suggests bribery as a correlating predicate offence under Australian law. Under the Commonwealth Criminal Code there is
118
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dual criminality, as it is also an indictable offence to give bribes or ‘corrupting benefits’125 to a Commonwealth public official.126 Third, as both Australian and Indonesia
are obliged to outlaw participation in transnational organized crime groups,127 and as
much of the illegal logging in Indonesia is transnational and organized, proscriptions on
participation in transnational organized crime groups might offer yet another basis for
establishing dual predicate offences in Australia and Indonesia. However, significant
differences in the approach of each country to implementing the obligation to criminalize participation in transnational organized crime negate their equivalence. 128 Fourth,
predicate crimes such as breaches of tax or import/export tariff laws might be applicable
depending on the circumstances related to the illegal logging.
Finally, in cases where imported timber itself is of an endangered species, the Commonwealth Environmental Protection Biodiversity Conservation Act proscribes the importation of species listed in circumstances other than those allowed under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna (CITES).129 Under CITES, international trade in some specified Indonesian timber species has been
restricted130 and it is therefore an offence to import those timber species for commercial
purposes or without an appropriate permit.131 This offence carries a penalty of up to 10
years imprisonment or AU$110,000. The limitation in relying on predicate offences related to CITES is that they apply only to species listed as ‘endangered’. Ramin is listed
on Appendix 3 of CITES, thereby prohibiting its commercial trade,132 but merbau, the
species used in our hypothetical scenario, is not currently listed.133
There is a valid argument that practical obstacles to using AML techniques against foreign illegal logging render successful criminal prosecutions unlikely. The complexity of
establishing dual criminality in predicate offences for timber crimes forms exemplifies
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the difficulty.134 Civil processes that form part of the AML toolkit may work more successfully.
CONFISCATION OF PROCEEDS
Confiscation under the Commonwealth Proceeds of Crime Act allows for forfeiture of
criminal assets based on conviction or for forfeiture based on a civil procedure. If based
on a conviction, the original crime must have been an indictable offence or a ‘serious
offence’.135 Following conviction, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions
can apply for forfeiture of the property comprising the proceeds.136 In the case of a serious offence, a pecuniary penalty may also be imposed.137
To initiate a ‘civil forfeiture’,138 the Director of Public Prosecutions must demonstrate,
on the balance of probability, that the money or property is the proceeds of an indictable
offence that occurred within six years prior to the launch of confiscation proceedings.
Once the presumption is raised, a defendant bears the burden of rebutting by proving
that, on the balance of probability, the relevant property was not the proceeds of such an
offence.139 Forfeited property vests in the government,140 but proceeds that are forfeited
from transnational offences can be shared with a concerned foreign country. 141 Civil
forfeiture under the Proceeds of Crime Act for a foreign indictable offence related to
illegal logging, such as theft, corruption, participation in a transnational organized crime
group, or tax or tariff evasion, can therefore proceed without even a conviction in Indonesia.142 For civil proceedings, the evidence need only prove, on the balance of probability, that the merbau flooring timber was produced from logs taken by such means in
Indonesia less than six years before the Australian confiscation proceedings commenced.
Under the Illegal Logging Prohibition Act 2012, forfeiture orders can be made by a
court against any property in association with a criminal conviction, and civil forfeiture
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of prohibited imports is also available without a court order.143 Therefore, failure to exercise due diligence in importing P.T. Graha Buana Indonesian timber products can result in confiscation and forfeiture of Hardware Wholesaler property. This is simpler
than AML forfeiture because it operates locally and does not require a predicate foreign
offence, dual criminality or a prior conviction and there is less need for mutual legal
assistance.
CONCLUSION
Indonesian law enforcement efforts against timber barons for illegal logging have been
ineffective in local prosecutions. It is clear that much of the illegal logging is transnational organized crime. Although no single solution is likely for this complicated problem, international cooperation could promote better law enforcement for Indonesian
forests. Strategies such as building Indonesian capacity to manage forest resources and
enforce existing regulations could be supplemented by responsible foreign controls on
imported timber. Australia, the European Union and the United states have introduced
due diligence requirements on importers to identify and certify timbers as sustainably
and legally sourced. These are obligatory and supported by unilateral criminal prohibitions that operate in the importation jurisdiction. It is important that these positive developments in import controls be introduced also in China – destination for half the
world’s illegally logged timber, and in other major wood processing markets such as
Vietnam.
Timber legality regimes are not infallible, however, and even diligent importers may be
duped by corrupt licensing, forgery and other fraudulent practices along the line of production and delivery of timber. Thus, AML law enforcement remains a tool to complement timber legality frameworks. The transnational reach of AML laws affords an opportunity to tackle the principal beneficiaries of illegal logging. Nevertheless, the legal
complexities of dual criminality in predicate offences and uncertainties of mutual legal
assistance can frustrate AML criminal proceedings. Therefore, AML civil procedures
for confiscating the presumed proceeds of crime, with a reduced burden of proof, are a
simpler and more effective alternative to criminal processes.
The legal tools to combat illegal logging discussed in this Indonesia-Australia case
study could be applied across other forms of transnational environmental crime. An era
of improved international coordination of national AML laws and of international cooperation in law enforcement to combat a broader range of transnational environmental
crimes is possible.
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